African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979-1999

In African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979-1999, Nicolas Van De Walle examines the on-going African economic crisis from a new perspective; like most other analysts, he explores the (mostly failed) economic policies that have contributed to a lag in African economic recovery, but he also broadens the discussion to consider political regimes and how their past decisions impact the current economy. Through his analysis of "neopatrimonial" governmental regimes and the dismal performance of African economies, Van De Walle concludes that postcolonial aid flows to Africa have actually contributed to, rather than prevented, continued economic crisis.

Though leaders first shied away from implementing the reforms required by institutions and countries providing aid, they began to realize that partial implementation not only served to placate donors, but also to derive political benefits. For instance, if they "privatized" certain industries, their personal bank accounts could reap the rewards. In essence, because regimes are first and foremost self-preserving, leaders only implemented reforms that strengthened, or at least did not threaten, their power and control. Leaders who might be perceived as relatively responsible inflicted fiscal austerity on populations by decreasing investment in infrastructure in order to balance out the increases in governmental consumption. In the long run, partial implementation generally resulted in either warlordism--due to an increasing focus on rent-seeking rather than rule of law--or an even greater centralization of power--due to increased governmental consumption. To Van De Walle, toothless statements of conditionality (concerning reform) that are attached to aid have contributed to, rather than solved, Africa's political corruption and economic hardship.

The political corruption inherent in many African governments is a byproduct of "neopatrimonialism." Van De Walle uses this term to describe hybrid governments that adopt the appearance of a Western rational-legal administration but continue to operate with clientelist tendencies, doling out privileges and offices to family members, friends, and political supporters. These regimes have high levels of autonomy, despite low capacity. Though many analysts equate autonomy with capacity, Van De Walle points out that while African governments were "endowed with little legitimacy" after colonization, (leading to low capacity), they remain highly stable and autonomous because non-state actors (i.e. interest groups) do not have enough resources or organizational structure to challenge the government.

Van De Walle further argues that postcolonial order has been maintained despite a long period of economic downfall and crisis because, and not despite, aid flows. For instance, even if commodity prices dropped sharply, governments did not feel as much pressure to change economic policies because aid flows sheltered them from the shock. Instead of increasing Africa's economic independence, aid flows have actually increased Africa's continued dependence on aid flows. Nevertheless, donors continue to lend because of internal pressure and few accountability mechanisms for failed programs. Van De Walle believes that institutions, such as the IMF, should reform their practices so that they fully consider a country's circumstances before providing aid and devising statements of conditionality and so that they work with a country's governmental regime rather than above it. For instance, by offering much higher salaries, the IMF has recruited many of the top minds in Kenya to work for it instead of the Kenya government. Though these practices hurt Africa in the long run, Van De Walle expresses hope that Africa's economy will soon recover. His optimism is due to decreasing aid flows to the region, which increases the government's need to respond to shocks and reform out-of-date policies. Nevertheless, his optimism is tempered by the fact that many of the African countries that have adopted democratic systems have not changed economic policies because they still have neopatrimonial governance. However, Van De Walle hopes that democratization will eventually increase political participation, which in turn would increase governmental accountability and lead to economic reform.

Van De Walle's exploration of Africa's permanent economic crisis widens the discussion from a purely economic approach to an economic and political approach. Nevertheless, he leaves some questions unanswered. He neglects to fully analyse the perceptions of Africans concerning donors, such as the IMF. Furthermore, he does not mention what effect, if any, educational reform would have on the economy. Should donors focus on improving the quality of education inside the country so that the skills of the work force will meet the demand of the job sector? Finally, I would have liked him to spend more time discussing the role (if any) that African values and culture play in the continuation of economic recession. Are neopatrimonial tendencies, resulting in clientelism, to some degree inherent in African governance due to the African value of kinship and community? Note that this book was published eleven years ago, and the discussion of African economics has since evolved. Nevertheless, Van De Walle's African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979-1999 greatly contributed to the discussion of African economic recovery by introducing additional components, such as political regimes and donor policies.